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I. INTRODUCTION
The mere mention of a formal global citizenship – an official, internationally
recognized status with some legal effect – confounds even the most liberal
Scholars who acknowledge the deterritorialization of
citizenship thinkers.3
citizenship hesitate endorsing a formal legal status as a “citizen of the world.”4 For
those who believe that the sole site of citizenship lies in the nation-state, such

1

Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.

2

J.D. candidate (August 2004); Editor-in-Chief, Florida Journal of International Law.

3

It should be mentioned that this definition differs from the typical use of “global”
citizenship in scholarship, where it has occasionally been taken as synonymous with
“postnational” or “transnational” citizenship; these latter concepts, however, deal with the
informal means by which citizenship has moved beyond the bounds of the nation-state, while
we mean to deal instead with a hypothetical formal method of doing the same thing. Linda
Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 449 (2000).
Because the postnational forms of citizenship include such factors as the growth of economic
globalization, international political action, and worldwide sociocultural exchange, all of
which receive various levels of institutional recognition, they cannot be said to be “formal” in
the same sense as a hypothetical global passport might be. Alejandro Portes et al., The Study
of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field, 22 ETHNIC &
RACIAL STUD. 217, 221, 223 (1999). That said, postnationalist thought is critical to the
analysis herein, and it will be discussed more fully below. See infra Part II.C.
4

See Bosniak, supra note 3, at 448.
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proposition is intrinsically contradictory.5 Historically, the most serious objection to
the concept of global citizenship has been the corollary need for a world government
which objectors assume, without offering any empirical support, will be a tyrannical
one.6
Notwithstanding the lack of support for a formal global citizenship, in recent
years much scholarship has suggested that the world is nevertheless informally
moving in that direction. Despite the historical reality that citizenship is centered on
the nation-state, as a factual matter citizenship is increasingly non-national in
character.7 For example, the growth of dual and multiple citizenship, the
international human rights regime, and the development of a formal European Union
citizenship all represent ways in which citizenship concepts are evolving in an
increasingly deterritorialized way.8
Such movement away from a state-bound conception of citizenship appears to
remove concerns about a formal global citizenship and the tyranny of its
government. This movement is occurring de facto, and significantly this has
5

According to the conventional definition of the term, citizenship has “little meaning
except in the context of a state.” Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism, in
FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 74 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996)
[hereinafter FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY].
6

Interestingly, the assumption about the tyranny of a world government is often made but
rarely justified. Its modern philosophical grounding seems to be in Kant, who feared that such
a government would become a “universal monarchy.” Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian
Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 87 (1992). The concept was powerfully
reinforced by Hannah Arendt when she wrote that “[a] world citizen, living under the tyranny
of a world empire, and speaking and thinking in a kind of glorified Esperanto, would be no
less a monster than a hermaphrodite.” HANNAH ARENDT, MEN IN DARK TIMES 89 (1968). But
historical context is important here. Kant wrote at the end of the 1700s, during a period where
humankind was just beginning to rebel against the absolute monarchies which had dominated
the early modern era (and Kant was clearly part of that rebellious, republican movement);
Arendt, on the other hand, was a German-born Jew writing after the experiences of the Second
World War nearly subjected the world to the same tyrannical domination she wrote of. See
Teson, supra, at 69 (identifying Kant as a “philosopher of the ordinary people”); Seyla
Benhabib, The Pariah and Her Shadow: Hannah Arendt’s Biography of Rahel Varnhagen, 23
POL. THEORY 5 (1995) (discussing Arendt’s relationship to her identity as a German Jew in the
context of her biography of Varnhagen). What remains unanswered is whether a present day
world government – founded on an ideal of universal affirmation, much like the United
Nations (however infeasible such a government might be) – would inevitably be doomed to
tyranny.
7

Bosniak, supra note 3, at 453-54.

8

Id. at 457-62. See also Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the Postnational
Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 979, 981-82 (2002) (discussing the claim
that multiple citizenship represents a form of postnationalism); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal,
Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organized Islam in European
Public Spheres, 26 THEORY & SOC’Y 509, 512-13 (1997) (discussing the transnationalization
of human rights); J. H.H. Weiler, Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union, 4
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 223, 242-43 (1998) (describing how European Union citizenship can be
viewed as a form of “supranationalism”, and noting that “there is another more tantalizing and
radical way of understanding the [EU’s citizenship] provision, namely as the very conceptual
decoupling of nationality from citizenship.”).
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occurred in the absence of a formal global nation-state. Thus, the remaining venue
for analysis concerning the feasibility and desirability of a global citizenship is the
question of the relationship of citizenship to state sovereignty. If indeed citizenship
is denationalized, it is necessary to determine what entity will have the ultimate
power over, and responsibility for, a particular individual with multiple alliances,
including both national and global ones.9 An independent global citizenship without
a local component and in the absence of the much-feared global government creates
two concerns. One, an individual may imperil the rights of others, without a
structure that can impose sanctions for the heinous conduct.10 Two, an individual’s
rights may be imperiled, and there may be no entity to provide protection.11
This essay proposes a model of a formal global citizenship that will alleviate
these concerns and prove both practically and theoretically feasible. The model
flows from the concept of dual or multiple nationality and offers global citizenship
only as an elective nationality. Such citizenship would co-exist with the nationality
acquired by birth or naturalization, thereby guaranteeing that at least one nation-state
always has the ultimate responsibility for the individual. At the same time, by
providing for careful considerations on who may acquire global citizenship, the
value and meaning inherent in citizenship can be preserved and enhanced.12 Indeed,
the idea of a global citizenship that is a formalized development emerging from the
human rights tradition can be a foundation for the attainment of full personhood by
those marginalized or disempowered within their own or foreign national borders –
the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, and women who at
present lack equal status in any local or global community.
To appreciate the interplay between the proposed formal global citizenship and
the citizenship tradition, our discussion will first review citizenship theories
grounded in the nation-state. We then will turn to critiques of these traditionalist
9

See Louis W. Goodman, Democracy, Sovereignty and Intervention, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 27, 27 (1993).
10
Because of the lack of a government to enforce rights over a global citizen, as we have
defined the concept here, such citizens might be said to be “stateless” within the traditional
meaning of the term, even though stateless persons are commonly defined as individuals with
no nationality. See Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmany, The Nationality of the Offender and the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 606, 616 (2001)
(discussing the problem of stateless offenders).
11
Bemma Donkoh, A Half-Century of International Refugee Protection: Who’s
Responsible, What’s Ahead?, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 260, 266-67 (2000) (discussing the
protection of stateless persons, and noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees has been charged with intervening on the behalf of such persons).
12
Preserving the value of citizenship necessarily implies that it should not be granted
universally to all people, despite what the phrase “global citizen” might suggest. Rather, a
supranational global citizenship body will be necessary to process applications for global
citizenship. Such an organization might be developed under the auspices of the United
Nations, but given widely variable national acceptance of dual nationality, it is unlikely that
global consensus could be achieved. A less universal, but more feasible alternative is to
establish the global citizenship body through a multilateral treaty, thus permitting states to
recognize it only if state law allows their citizens to maintain dual nationality status. Specific
characteristics of such a body (and the treaty creating it) are necessarily conjecture, but the
basic structure will be explored in Part III.A.
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approaches which suggest that not all questions of citizenship can be dealt with in
national terms. The conflict between these two approaches is clear in the case of
dual nationality, which provides the foundation for our global citizenship model.
With that foundation in place, in Part III, ‘Towards a Formal Global Citizenship,’ we
turn to the theoretical and practical aspects of the proposed model, particularly in the
area of statelessness. Finally, we can see the real-world impact of these practical
benefits in the ongoing case of the Guantánamo prisoners.
II. CITIZENSHIP THEORY AND GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
There are two broad conceptualizations of citizenship: citizenship-as-legal-status
and citizenship-as-desirable-activity.13 The first conceives of citizenship as a
formalized relationship between a community and its members, while the second
talks about participation and identification as the defining characteristics of
citizenship.14 Citizenship-as-legal-status is a legal and political understanding of
citizenship; citizenship-as-desirable-activity is a philosophical and moral one. One
critique of this dichotomy is that the two categories overlap a great deal, in that
certain moral understandings of citizenship imply support for corresponding legal
definitions of citizenship. For example, the cosmopolitan’s moral embrace of
humankind as the basic unit of value, rather than the members of one’s own family,
community, or nation, implies the postnational legal conception of citizenship, which
transcends states as the sole means of granting or defining citizenship.15 The
analysis is often more complex, however; a cosmopolitan may embrace the
betterment of humanity as a moral virtue for which to strive, but in accordance with
the cosmopolitan mantra “think globally, act locally,” such a cosmopolitan may
prefer the civic republican approach to citizenship-as-legal-status, which advocates
devotion to the community in which one resides.16 Below, we discuss the legal and
philosophical views of citizenship as separate. It is noteworthy that while their
presentation below preserves the separations that have historically developed, they
do not exist in isolation.
A. The Legal View: Citizenship-as-Legal-Status
In the wake of World War II, modern citizenship theory developed the idea of
“passive” or “private” citizenship.17 This view of citizenship stresses the importance
of membership in society by guaranteeing rights to certain persons who are
13

Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 353 (1994).
14

Id.

15

We should remark at this point that our choice of “cosmopolitanism” to refer to
philosophical trends grounded in the Stoics and Kant is a potentially risky one, given that the
term was at one time associated with anti-Semitic meaning. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN EXPLAINED: CORRESPONDENCE 1982-1985 47 (Julian Pefanis & Morgan Thomas
eds., Don Barry et al. trans., 1992). Throughout this work, we use cosmopolitanism to mean
the idea that human beings can form part of a unitary community that should be nurtured,
rather than any connotation that might imply tribalism or ultranationalism.
16

See Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1007, 1042-46 (2001).

17

Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 354-55.
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members–the citizens–and denying them to noncitizen “outsiders.”18 These rights
are passive, as they are acquired without any effort on the part of the individual
citizen.19
In passive citizenship, a strong welfare state is necessary to assure a citizen's
rights by helping all citizens feel like equal members of society, and permitting the
poor to exercise their political rights on a par with the rich.20 Significantly, this is
also the basis of criticisms of passive citizenship. By guaranteeing rights without
requiring active participation in the state, passive citizenship makes citizens
dependent on the state for their political identities; this is the “New Right” view of
citizenship.21 Instead of guaranteeing rights for all citizens regardless of their
participation in society, the New Right seeks to reduce the welfare state and to
develop a system of mutual obligation that assures the grant of full and equal rights
only to those who make an economic contribution to society.22 However, when this
view was put into actual practice, reducing the welfare state did little to make the
poor more responsible citizens, and succeeded only in reducing their ability to
participate economically in society.23
The tensions exhibited by the passive citizenship and New Right models gave
rise to a series of new approaches to citizenship-as-legal-status which charted a
middle course involving “a balance of rights and responsibilities.”24 Two of the
novel approaches have had a marked impact on recent citizenship thought,
particularly with respect to globalization–the civic republican and civil society
models. Civic republicanism’s virtues lie in a “committed engagement in the life of
the polity” and a “willing commitment to the common good” as contrasted with the
atomistic, solely self-interested goals of the liberal rights-based approaches.25 Civic
republicanism’s harshest criticism is grounded on the observation that, while it treats
political participation (rather than personal attachments) as an ideal and perfect goal,
such is not the reality for the overwhelming majority of humankind.26 In contrast,
the civil society model stresses the ultimate importance of participation in the
political community. However, it also suggests that the exchange of membership
responsibilities for guaranteed rights is learned in the personal spaces associated with
18
Id.; see also T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP
(1964).

AND

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 71-73

19

Id. This is also substantially similar to Gerald Neuman’s definition of unilateral
liberalism, though he approaches the matter from the standpoint of naturalization; the choice
to naturalize is that of the individual, but once that choice is made, the rights attendant to
citizenship are guaranteed. See Gerald Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35
VA. J. INT’L L. 237, 238-39 (1994).
20

Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 354-55.

21

Id. at 355-56.

22

Id. at 356.

23

Id. at 356-57.

24

Id. at 360.

25

Neuman, supra note 19, at 240, 245.

26

Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY:
PLURALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND COMMUNITY 89, 92 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992).
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civil society–church, family, and other elective associations.27 The critique of the
civil society model warns that the virtues learned in those spaces may be intolerance,
discrimination, and suspicion of one’s fellow man, all of which are at odds with the
democratic nature considered ideal in our polity.28 In addition, the civil society
model may be misguided in relying on voluntary associations to provide civic virtue
because, quite simply, these organizations do not exist to teach virtue to their
members.29 Rather, they exist to promote and protect the status quo.
Citizenship-as-legal-status raises one more tangential dilemma: the interrogation
of the importance of maintaining the value of citizenship. Even if we presuppose the
decline of nation-state sovereignty, states themselves still exist, and “[t]he state still
stands for something, as do the societies that states represent.”30 Societies have an
interest in preserving their uniqueness, and to do so, states must remain closed
groups.31 Modern conceptions of state citizenship might be likened to a club, where
an admissions committee decides who should be members, what the requirements for
entry are, and the rights and responsibilities to be derived from such membership.32
B. The Philosophical View: Citizenship-as-Desirable-Activity
The citizenship-as-desirable-activity model treats citizenship as a matter of
personal identification and belonging. One such view is advocated by
cosmopolitanism which, as a philosophy, was created by the Stoics, revitalized by
Kant, and is inherent in many of the international legal developments of the past
century.33 Although cosmopolitanism “has been used to describe a wide variety of
important views in moral and socio-political philosophy,” at its center all versions
agree with a central idea: “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation,
do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be
cultivated.”34 Cosmopolitanism raises numerous concerns, two of which can be
designated as ethical/moral and cultural.35 Ethical or moral cosmopolitanism “is a
27

Id. at 104.

28

Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 363-64.

29

Id. at 364.

30

Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411,
1479-80 (1997).
31

Yaffa Zilbershats, Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 689, 696
(2001).
32

Id. at 696-97.

33

A full discussion of the history of cosmopolitanism is beyond the scope of this paper, but
for just such a review, see generally Derek Heater, Cosmopolis, The Way to Peace?, 9 PEACE
REV. 315 (1997).
34

Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown, Cosmopolitanism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2002), at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/ (last visited August
29, 2003).
35
Id.; Bernard Yack, Cosmopolitan Humility, BOSTON REV., Feb.-Mar. 1995, at 17. A
third strand is political cosmopolitanism, which centers around the notion of international
political arrangements ranging from advocates of a world state to those who favor
international political institutions that direct their attention to particular issues. See Kleingeld
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perspective committed to the well-being of humanity at large, rather than any
particular community of persons.”36 A cultural cosmopolitan, on the other hand, has
been described as one who “learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in
Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment,
follows Ukrainian politics, and practices Buddhist meditation techniques.”37
Cosmopolitans have heralded globalization as a final vindication of an ancient
ideal–the “citizen of the world” originally envisioned by the Stoics.38 In the
development of a system of international law that respects human rights, ethical
cosmopolitans see the incorporation of Kantian ideals.39 Similarly, a multivariate
culture, with elements of numerous cultures involved in one’s daily life, is a direct
result of the increased international trade and travel that has come along with
But cosmopolitanism is not without its critics.
Cultural
globalization.40
cosmopolitanism has been lambasted as destructive of the very cultural diversity it
purports to protect, and as possibly encouraging extreme nationalism or tribalism.41
By encouraging the homogenization of culture, such universalism threatens to
destroy the very things that make cultures unique.42
Ethical cosmopolitanism has received its share of criticism as well. In opposition
to the moral universalism espoused by cosmopolitanism are statist or nationalist
philosophies.43 These philosophies propose that cosmopolitanism is misguided
because individuals cannot conceive of humanity as a whole, let alone interact with
it; rather, individuals interact only within their immediate communities and thus their

& Brown, supra note 34. The largest critique of political cosmopolitanism addresses the
impossibility of supplanting nation-states with a world-system of governance. Id.; see also
discussion supra note 6.
36
See Kleingeld & Brown, supra note 34 (defining moral cosmopolitanism as “a ‘moral’
commitment to helping human beings as such.”).
37

Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 751, 754 (1992); see also Kleingeld & Brown, supra note 34 (rejecting “attachment
to parochial culture,” encouraging “cultural diversity and appreciat[ing] a multicultural
mélange” while “reject[ing] strong nationalism.”).
38

See Bosniak, supra note 3, at 448.

39

David Held, What Hope for the Future?: Learning the Lessons of the Past, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 381, 382 (2002) (“Immanuel Kant wrote over two hundred years ago that
we are ‘unavoidably side by side.’ A violent challenge to law and justice in one place has
consequences for many other places and can be experienced everywhere.”). Held goes on to
state that “[c]osmopolitan principles are not principles for some remote utopia; they are at the
center of significant post-Second World War legal and political developments, from the 1948
UN Declaration of Human Rights to the 1998 adoption of the Statute of the International
Criminal Court.” Id. at 399.
40
See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Human Rights, Globalization and Culture, in
MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 353, 361 (Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol
ed., 2002).
41

Id.; see also supra notes 15 and 37.

42

Hernández-Truyol, supra note 40, at 361.

43

See Chander, supra note 16, at 1007.
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conception of self is necessarily locally grounded.44 The flaw in this argument is that
individuals should be no more able to conceive of and identify with a billion of their
fellow citizens (as a citizen of India or China might possess) than they should be able
to relate with six-and-a-half-billion of their fellow humans.45 A connected question
is why persons who happen to be our fellow citizens–a largely accidental group of
cohorts–should take precedence over those with whom we consciously identify.46
Rather than engage these questions directly, the trend has been to extol the virtues of
the nation-state as the ideal focus for one’s moral engagement with one’s fellow
humans; in doing so, statists acknowledge globalizing trends but deny that they have
replaced the state.47
C. Recent Critiques
Recently, scholars focusing on the postnationalization, transnationalization,
denationalization, or globalization of citizenship have challenged the idea that
citizenship must necessarily be grounded in the nation-state, the notion underlying
traditional legal conceptions of citizenship.48 With postnationalization the focus is
on a variety of international activities that in isolation constitute only scattered
instances of cross-border activity, but as a whole represent a major shift in
understanding citizenship.49 Rather than defining citizenship as a relationship
between an individual and a state, postnationalism embraces a much broader array of
interactions between individuals, states, and NGOs.50 These interactions are present
in a number of recent developments: an increase of dual and multiple nationality;51
the development of an international human rights regime;52 the internationalization
of political activity through NGOs;53 and a sense of transnational belonging held by
44

Bosniak, supra note 3, at 496-97.

45

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited August 23, 2003).
46

Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY, supra
note 5, at 3, 7 (“The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident.”).
47

Bosniak, supra note 3, at 498-99.

48

Id. at 449 n.6. “Postnationalism” speaks of these trends in citizenship theory.

49

See id.

50

See id. at 450. In general terms these include “cross-border organizing efforts in the
areas, for example, of human rights, the environment, arms control, women’s rights, labor
rights, and the rights of national minorities.” Id. at 474.
51
Soysal, supra note 8, at 512. But see Bosniak, supra note 8, at 1003 (arguing that
multiple nationality is not destroying the nation-state as the locus of citizenship, but simply
multiplying it).
52

But see Bosniak, supra note 3, at 467-69 (arguing that one should be careful in placing
too much emphasis on the development of international human rights as a form of
postnationality, as the regime actually does fairly little to protect the individual).
53

Peter J. Spiro, Globalization, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 567, 571 (2000) (recognizing that “non-state actors enjoy expanded formal rights of
participation in intergovernmental standard-setting processes and often perform delegated
monitoring and enforcement functions.”).
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many individuals, especially among immigrant communities that retain ties to their
country of origin.54 Postnationalism does not discount the viability or significance of
conventional nation-state citizenship; rather, it conceives of these more traditional
concepts as one facet of a “citizenship that is multiple and overlapping.”55
The significance of these trends is a subject of much debate. Some suggest that
the increase of extranational modes of citizenship represents a decline of state
sovereignty.56 Others, however, point to the rise of new nation-states following the
collapse of old empires, and nationalistic impulses on the part of many groups
around the world, as evidence that the nation-state remains strong despite these
globalizing trends.57 Some seek to resolve this tension by charting a middle road,
suggesting that postnational forms of citizenship can exist and retain significance
without necessarily derogating the importance of national citizenship.58 We propose
a third way which, rather than attempting to chart a middle course, rejects the
either/or posture and takes a both/and approach. We posit that, while globalization
does erode sovereignty, it merely changes rather than devalues the nation-state.
Thus, while the question of whether postnationalism represents a global citizenship
in lieu of a national one is contested intellectual terrain, under our third way a
codification of these postnational trends through a formal global citizenship still
requires the assent of states from which more conventional ideas of citizenship are
derived. Therefore, we conceive of a formal global citizenship as existing in tandem
with, rather than as a replacement for or in opposition to, national citizenship.
D. Dual Nationality
The concept of dual nationality is of utility in conceiving of global citizenship as
coexisting rather than competing with national citizenship.59 To be sure, dual
nationality is also contested terrain in the citizenship field. 60 As such, it has both
theoretical and practical ramifications for a formal global citizenship model.
Governments tend to disfavor dual nationality because it creates an individual “of

54
Maria Patricia Fernández-Kelly, Immigration, Poverty and Transnationalism, in MORAL
IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 337, 344.
55

Bosniak, supra note 3, at 450.

56

See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN
WORLD ECONOMY (1996); Saskia Sassen, Economic Globalization and the Redrawing of
Citizenship, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 135.
THE

57
Schuck, supra note 27, at 10.
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
58

See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVERIGNTY:

See Bosniak, supra note 8, at 1003.

59

The basic definition of dual or multiple nationality is “[t]he simultaneous retention of
more than one nationality.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 1219 n.12 (3d ed. 2002). While theoretically simple, the reality is somewhat more
complex, because “every sovereign state decides who its own nationals are”, “the typical law
provides alternative, multiple routes to nationality,” and “the rules vary from state to state.”
Id. at 1219.
60

“Until very recently, the nearly unbroken scholarly tradition has been to tolerate dual
citizenship but not to applaud it.” Id. at 1221.
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divided, and often conflicting, loyalties and duties.”61 Dual nationals may lead to
international tensions when two countries attempt to exert control over them, and
create security problems in times of war, such as the possibility of sabotage or
treason on behalf of one nation (and nationality) against the other.62 Because
citizenship is a domestic, not an international, concern, nations are free to limit their
citizens’ ability to obtain dual nationality, and many have done just that. Of the
countries responding to a 1998 survey, only about half (66 out of 128) had some
form of dual nationality.63 At the same time, states (even some of which permit dual
nationality) have made efforts to limit dual nationality on the international level
through bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as the Convention on the
Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality.64
While dual nationality as a paradigm is often disfavored formally, restrictions
against such status are often systematically ignored, giving way to the reality that
around the world people, beyond their multiple informal allegiances to more than
one nation-state, frequently enjoy formal allegiances to two or more nations. In the
United States, for example, citizens who naturalize elsewhere violate the oath of
allegiance and may be expatriated (i.e. lose their citizenship).65 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, has held that even a citizen who knowingly and voluntarily applies
for citizenship in another country cannot lose his or her U.S. citizenship unless that
individual expressly intends to renounce it.66 This tacit acceptance of dual
nationality evidences “the transformed nature of citizenship in a postnational world,
a world in which national affiliations no longer clearly trump other associational

61

David S. Gordon, Section V Civil Rights: Dual Nationality and the United States Citizen,
102 MIL. L. REV. 181 (1983).
62
Spiro, supra note 30, at 1414-15. Though not strictly a case of dual nationality, the
bombing of the UN building in Baghdad provides a chilling example of the effect divided
loyalties can have. Iraqi security guards employed by the UN–their loyalty potentially split
between the ousted Hussein regime and the occupying government overseen by the UN–are
being investigated as potential co-conspirators in the attack. See Gareth Smyth, Iraq’s
Political Groups Seek Role in Security: Aftermath of UN Bombing, THE FINANCIAL TIMES
(LONDON), August 23, 2003, at 6.
63

Eugene Goldstein and Victoria Piazza, Naturalization, Dual Citizenship and Retention of
Foreign Citizenship: A Survey, 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1613, 1629-32 (1998).
64

Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in
Cases of Multiple Nationality, May 6, 1963, 634 U.N.T.S. 221 (stating “that cases of multiple
nationality are liable to cause difficulties and that joint action to reduce as far as possible the
number of cases of multiple nationality, as between member States, corresponds to the aims of
the Council of Europe.”).
65
For the oath of renunciation and allegiance, see Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1448 (1997); for means by which nationality can be lost, see Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1997).
66

See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255 (1967).
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attachments . . . .”67 The rise of dual nationality shows a domestic trend, rather than
a global phenomenon.68
Currently, there is vigorous ongoing debate as to what extent the increasing
incidence of dual nationality is a sign of weakening state sovereignty.69 What is
patent, however, is that dual nationality is a status with increasing importance–both
to individuals and to nation-states–which appears with increasing regularity in the
present world. Moreover, dual national status can at times provide “unique
advantages in terms of freedom of movement and of economic establishment,”
garner dual nationals “international protection from both governments,” and offer
opportunities for political participation in both locations of loyalty.70
III. TOWARDS A FORMAL GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
A. Theoretical Ramifications
Notwithstanding the lack of universal support for dual nationality, it is a useful
paradigm for interrogating the viability and desirability of a formal global
citizenship. For example, countries that prohibit their own citizens from maintaining
dual nationality are unlikely to support a formal global citizenship that may be
perceived to interfere with their unfettered sovereign claim over such citizens. The
global citizenship to be proposed is likely to require the consent of sovereigns
through a multilateral treaty, thus permitting objecting countries to refuse recognition
of global passport holders. However, in light of the de facto globalized citizenship
model that has emerged through the human rights system, a formalized global
citizenship should be aspirationally universally embraced.71 The formal global
citizenship we propose will avoid the basic problem with dual nationality—the
interplay of supremacy between two sovereign bodies (traditionally, nation-states). 72
The model proposed would neither create nor require a global government which
would inevitably struggle with individual nation-states for ultimate authority over
individuals. Consequently, even those nations that discourage dual nationality might
find formal global citizenship a workable model.
Global citizenship is a model based on the idea of the universality of human
rights to which all people are entitled by virtue of their humanness. Formally, it has
four basic characteristics.
1) A formal global citizenship must protect the trappings of personhood
by being grounded in human rights norms. Insofar as states may infringe

67

Spiro, supra note 30, at 1416.

68

Bosniak, supra note 8, at 998 (“To the extent that dual or multiple nationality is
increasingly tolerated today, this tolerance is a function of states’ own decisions.”).
69

See id. at 992-95; Zilbershats, supra note 31, at 725-33.

70

Gordon, supra note 61, at 181; Fernández-Kelly, supra note 54, at 347.

71

See, e.g., Hernández-Truyol, supra note 40, at 353; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward
a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 40, at 39.
72

Zilbershats, supra note 31, at 732.
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on these rights, global citizenship must endeavor to advance the cause of
those who hold it on the international plane.
2) A formal global citizenship must defer to the nation-state as the site of
the individual's “primary” citizenship. This is chiefly a matter of making
global citizenship palatable, both theoretically, since many citizenship
theories require the primary focus of one's political energies on the polity,
and practically, since nations are unlikely to agree to any structure that
significantly derogates from their sovereignty.
3) Formal global citizenship must be established by multilateral treaty.
This is important, since it permits nations to opt out of the formal global
citizenship apparatus if they so choose. Such a treaty must also by its
terms prevent the passage of global citizenship from person to person,
requiring instead that they actively seek it. By doing so, global citizens
can be assured that world citizenship does not simply represent a valueless
status granted on everyone in the world (as the name might otherwise
imply). At the same time, because those possessing global citizenship
must make a conscious effort to acquire it, its possession will maintain
significance for them.
4) Formal global citizenship will require a structure to review petitions
for global citizenship, but one that would include both substantive and
procedural normative standards that would not encroach on sovereign
prerogatives of states such as taxation, conscription, or prosecution. A
workable global citizenship model must provide for an admissions
committee and admissions procedure to consider applications and any
disputes that may arise surrounding them.
Each of the citizenship theories discussed above creates hurdles that any
workable model of global citizenship must overcome. These problems exist because,
fundamentally, the traditional views of citizenship assume the nation-state to be the
ultimate site of citizenship, and insist on the high value of political participation,
either in the nation-state or in some component thereof. The agreeability of a formal
global citizenship with such ideas depends heavily on the value placed on such
political participation. For example, the passive citizenship model stresses the rights
guaranteed to citizens, and sees political participation as a benefit to be derived from
these rights.73 In the model presented here, the global citizen will ultimately derive
rights from the nation-state–not only by possessing a nation-state citizenship as one’s
“primary” citizenship but also by virtue of the nation-state’s acquiescence to formal
global citizenship through a treaty or other international agreement–and
consequently, the role of the nation-state in passive citizenship is secure. Only
insofar as the global citizen enjoys unequal rights in comparison to other global
citizens might problems exist.
The New Right approach, however, complicates matters by adding to the
equation the responsibilities of the citizen to participate actively in the community.74
73

See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 13, at 354.

74

Id. at 356.
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The New Right model is grounded in the need to be an economic participant. Given
the reality that a global citizenship favors and facilitates free movement, being an
economic participant is more likely for global citizens.
Civic republicanism, however, presents a much greater problem than the passive
citizenship and New Right approaches. In requiring a commitment to the polity as
opposed to individual goals, civic republicans require not only the location of
citizenship in the nation-state, but also the focus of individuals’ political energies on
only one nation-state.75 It is the civic republican's position that dual nationality itself
is only valuable insofar as it encourages participation in a polity where one resides
but could not otherwise participate.76 Under a civic republican model, dual citizens
should not be permitted to exercise political rights in both venues.77 Civic
republicanism also demands the preservation of the value of citizen status, which has
significance for both national and global citizenship. Formal global citizenship must
simultaneously offer its own value, and avoid infringing on the value of nation-state
citizenship.
Given that civic republicanism does not embrace dual nationality except in very
specific circumstances, it cannot be reconciled with a global citizenship based on
dual nationality. On the other hand, as a practical matter, the lack of a global
government in which to participate makes it perfectly plausible to devote the whole
of one’s political energy to the nation-state of one's primary citizenship. Civil
society theory, in contrast, is fully compatible with a formal global citizenship. By
preventing the transmission of formal global citizenship by blood (jus sanguinis) or
soil (jus soli), gaining global citizenship essentially represents another form of
elective association.78 The value learned from electing to associate with a world
community is responsibility to the global rather than simply the local. Consequently,
civil society theory may also comport well with cosmopolitan philosophy. And, as
with civic republicanism, because there is no global government to distract the
political activities of a global citizen, an individual’s political energies can be
directed solely towards the state where he or she holds primary citizenship.
From a philosophical standpoint, the global citizenship structure proposed here
might appear inherently cosmopolitan; after all, it would quite literally create
“citizens of the world.” But statist doctrine has its place, not so much in elevating
the nation-state as an ideal mode of moral engagement but in cautioning against the
excesses of cosmopolitanism. In advocating ethical/moral and cultural universalism,
75

David A. Martin, New Rules on Dual Nationality for a Democratizing Globe: Between
Rejection and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22 (1999). (“[E]ncouraging full engagement
in a single polity is a valid goal, consistent with healthy democracy (and especially so within a
civic republican conception of democracy).”).
76

David A. Martin, The Civic Republican Ideal for Citizenship, and for Our Common Life,
35 VA. J. INT’L L. 301, 310 (1994).
77

See id. at 315.

78

Literally meaning “right of the blood”, jus sanguinis transfers to an individual the
nationality of their parents, no matter where they happen to be born. LEGOMSKY, supra note
59, at 1193. In contrast, jus soli, meaning “right of the land”, grants to an individual the
nationality of the country born in, no matter the nationality of the person’s parents. Id. These
two principles are the means by which one might acquire citizenship on birth; the third
method, naturalization, is how one acquires citizenship after birth. Id. at 1203.
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cosmopolitanism runs the risk of becoming ethically and culturally tyrannical. It is
therefore vital to keep in mind, when considering the ethical cosmopolitan focus on
humankind as a whole, that humankind is at some basic level comprised of
individuals.79 On a moral level, then, it is important to concentrate on the moral
good in protecting individual needs for sustenance and personal development as the
root motivation underlying international human rights initiatives, rather than
stressing the moral benefits of such rights to humanity as a whole.80 By giving
individuals global significance in a genuine institutional framework, a world
citizenship could do much to further this goal.81 Similarly, we must remain wary of
cultural cosmopolitanism, which might grant no special defense to minority cultures
in the face of cultural universalism.82 Indeed, if we hope to gain from global
citizenship the sorts of cultural benefits discussed in this essay, it is imperative that
minority cultures be defended zealously. And again, global citizenship, by providing
members of such cultures with a global voice that they might lack when subsumed
within a nation-state, could further this goal.
To be sure, the human rights model provides a template for the creation of this
global voice by granting to individuals certain rights which are presumptively nonderogable.83 Arising in response to the experiences of World War II and the Nazi
war atrocities, the human rights regime fundamentally redefined the relationship of
the individual to the nation-state by making human beings subjects, rather than
simply objects, of international law.84 Significantly for the model presented here,
this redefinition resulted in a concept of personhood beyond traditional definitions
grounded in territory or citizenship.85 Though human rights have had a clear impact
on sovereigns vis-a-vis individuals, many times the rights guaranteed are ignored
when expedient for the sovereign.86 The formal global citizenship model can,
however, provide a practical as well as symbolic corollary to the rights theoretically
guaranteed by the international human rights system.
B. Formal Global Citizenship and the Stateless
A formal global citizenship grounded on human rights principles in the context of
a postnational system fundamentally divorced from the nation-state permits a greater
number of individuals to enjoy their theoretically non-derogable rights. The
separation of the citizen from the nation-state and the nation-state from the citizen
79

This essential distinction is, it might be hypothesized, at the root of the cosmopolitan
mantra “think globally, act locally”. See Chander, supra note 16, at 1043-44.
80

See generally Held, supra note 39, at 398-99.

81

See Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 51
(discussing the importance of an institutional framework in the furtherance of human rights
goals).
82

Waldron, supra note 37, at 762.

83

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art 4., 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
84
85
86

Hernández-Truyol, supra note 40, at 353.
Id.
The Guantánamo situation is an excellent example of this. See infra Part IV.
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gives rise to an interaction which is deterritorialized, relational, and identity-based.
This identity-based model allows legal discourse between individuals and states on
social and cultural grounds, where previously the interrogation would end when the
legal status (that is, nationality) of the individual was determined.
The
deterritorialized aspect of this interrelation creates a functional national relationship
based, not on the nation's view of the individual, but rather the individual's view of
themselves.
Consequently, the chief beneficiaries of global citizenship are the stateless.87
Some have suggested that dual nationality could be of benefit to the stateless by
providing an alternate site of citizenship in the event one nationality is lost.88
Continuing the analogy to dual nationality, global citizenship could be of value to the
stateless by giving them a “fall-back” position. It should be stressed, though, that
even for the stateless, global citizenship would not provide a “primary” citizenship–
rather, it would provide a secondary citizenship while awaiting the resolution of the
individual’s primary nationality. This status might also lend legitimacy to the claim
of responsibility by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees over
stateless persons, mandated by the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness.89 This would be especially true if the global citizenship agency was
organized under the auspices of the United Nations.
A formal global citizenship goes further. The deterritorialized conception of
nationality cannot directly solve the problem of statelessness, but conceiving of
nationality in such terms is of great utility to those seeking redress for international
wrongs. Identifying individuals with nations that share their cultural or social norms
permits a stateless individual to bring to their plight to the attention of a nation. In
doing so, internationally recognized processes and human rights can be enforced, and
problems of fundamental justice for the stateless can be obviated. This combines
two theoretical aspects of citizenship–the identification aspect of cosmopolitan
philosophy, and the human rights aspect of postnational theory–to provide a single,
functional aspect of a legal status as a nation's citizen, the right to petition the
government of that nation to uphold one's interests on the international plane. Of
course, to uphold a concept of justice requires that the individual must be able to
designate a nation or nations with which they most closely identify, to prevent the
nation with control of the stateless individual from dictating the individual's interests
to them. Conversely, the nation designated by the individual must have the freedom
to take up their cause or not as they see fit, as is traditional on the international plane.
In short, what is guaranteed by formal global citizenship is not the right of the
stateless individual to their human rights, many of which are non-derogable; it is
instead the right of states to come to the aid of stateless individuals who identify with
them.
IV. GUANTÁNAMO BAY AND GLOBAL CITIZENS
To be of utility, a formal global citizenship must first be practical. It must
provide real people with actual advantages they would not enjoy in the absence of
87

As mentioned above, the term is one that applies to individuals with no nationality. See
discussion supra note 10.
88

See, e.g., Martin, supra note 76, at 311.

89

See Donkoh, supra note 11, at 266-67.
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global citizen status. Recent events provide us an all-too-real lens through which to
examine the practical benefits of a formal global citizenship, particularly with regard
to the plight of the stateless.
By now the events of September 11th, 2001 are known worldwide. On that day,
a group of terrorists equipped with box cutters seized control of four planes and used
them to launch attacks against the World Trade Center towers in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The United States quickly linked these attacks to the
terrorist network Al Qaeda, and used that link to justify a “war on terror.” The initial
action in this new kind of war was the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom on
October 7th, 2001 against Al Qaeda and the Taliban group, in effective control of
much of Afghanistan, that harbored them. What is not as widely known as these
facts is the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the human rights crisis
that has subsequently developed. Though the U.S.-led offensive was over in a matter
of weeks, it took over 600 prisoners, most of whom are now held at the U.S. naval
base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.90 Now, more than two years later, the status of most
of these individuals remains unclear.
This situation is particularly distressing when examined from a human rights
perspective. The prisoners at Guantánamo have been held in cramped, chain-link
cages and are allowed only 20 minutes of activity three times a week.91 They are
limited in their communication with each other and with the outside world, with
censorship of their letters commonplace.92 Additionally, at least three juveniles are
held at Guantánamo Bay in a facility called Camp Iguana, all “boys between the ages
of 13 and 15.”93 The United States government asserts that the prisoners at
Guantánamo, as well as those at Baghram Air Force Base in Afghanistan and on the
island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean (both of which have also been used to
house prisoners) are well-cared for, and their physical and spiritual needs have been
attended to.94 However, there have been at least two deaths and a number of suicide

90

The precise number of individuals currently held at Guantánamo is unclear; the U.S. has
prohibited unrestricted access to the prisoners and has not been particularly forthcoming with
information about their status. The most recent estimates put the number at 680, hailing from
40 different countries. See Sarah Lyall, Death Penalty Ruled Out for Two British Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at A4.
91

Ted Conover, In the Land of Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES June 29, 2003, Section 6 at 40.

92

Letter from Michael Ratner, Center for Constitutional Rights, to Santiago Canton,
Executive Secretary, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 8-9 (Mar. 4, 2003), at
http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/OASTotureLetter.pdf (last visited August 23, 2003)
[hereinafter CCR Letter].
93

Conover, supra note 91.

94

For example, prisoners at Guantánamo are provided with prayer caps, oils, beads, copies
of the Koran, and access to a Muslim chaplain; they are also provided with “a diet that is
similar to that of the soldiers who guard them”, prepared in accordance with the appropriate
Islamic procedures. Neil A. Lewis, Detainees from the Afghan War Remain in a Legal Limbo
in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at A1. However, conditions at Baghram Air Force Base
in Afghanistan may be a good deal worse. See infra note 99. The status of any prisoners held
at Diego Garcia remains unknown, as the base is off-limits to all but military personnel. See
CCR Letter, supra note 92, at 8.
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attempts at the camps over the last two years.95 Additionally, many of the assertions
made by prisoners in their correspondence, or by former prisoners, allege specific
instances of maltreatment. Some reports suggest that prisoners are “made to stand
hooded, their arms raised and chained to the ceiling, their feet shackled, unable to
move for hours at a time, day and night,” sometimes while forced to remain naked.96
One prisoner claims to have not seen the sun for most of a year.97 These conditions
have, unsurprisingly, led many prisoners to deteriorate in physical and mental
health.98 There are also some assertions that captors have taken more active roles in
inflicting physical and psychological damage.99
The United States has taken a stance that suggests the Guantánamo prisoners are
unequal to non-captives in both legal and human rights; in essence, that they lack
personhood as conceived of in the traditional citizenship sense. While the
Guantánamo prisoners have received some modicum of respect for their cultural
rights (such as the accommodation of their religious beliefs), two areas that have
particularly suffered are the legal and civil rights of the prisoners. For example, no
Guantánamo captive has been permitted to consult with an attorney, and none has yet
been charged with any crime.100 Many have been moved from country to country
while their habeas corpus petitions were still pending.101 This is the benefit of
95
Both deaths were at Baghram Air Force Base, and one was classified as a homicide; the
other remains unexplained. See Carlotta Gall, Threats and Responses: Prisoners; U.S.
Military Investigating Death of Afghan in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A14. The
documented suicide attempts were at Guantánamo, and by late June the number was 28
attempts by 18 prisoners. Conover, supra note 91. One prisoner is in a persistent vegetative
state as a result. Id.
96

Gall, supra note 95.

97

CCR Letter, supra note 92, at 2.

98

Id. A number of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay are suffering from serious depression
which has required psychiatric medication in some cases. See Conover, supra note 91.
99

Most accusations of physical or mental abuse have emanated from Baghram, where one
section, operated by the CIA, is off-limits to even the Red Cross. Vikram Dodd, The UK
Businessmen Trapped In Guantánamo, The Guardian (London), July 11, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,12469,995989,00.html (last visited August 23,
2003). One portion of Baghram is “commonly associated with accusations of torture by US
agents”, and one technique has come to be referred to by the sinister title “torture light”. Id.
This is substantiated by U.S. officials, who suggested after the capture of Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed that the CIA would “use every means at its disposal, short of what it considers
outright torture, to try to crack him”. Eric Lichtblau and Adam Liptak, Questioning to Be
Legal, Humane, and Aggressive, The White House Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2003, at A13.
What is unclear, of course, is whether “what it” – that is, what the CIA considers torture
comports with the U.S. and international definitions of that term.
100

See Lyall, supra note 90. The sole attempt to try any of the prisoners–specifically, six
prisoners, including two Britons and one Australian–before a military tribunal was met with a
storm of criticism, largely from Britons who feared their countrymen could receive the death
penalty. Id.
101
See, e.g., CCR Letter, supra note 92, at 2, 4. This appears to be part of what might be
termed a “shell game” on the part of the U.S. government to keep prisoners out of the
jurisdictional reach of any court.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

17

114

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:97

Guantánamo to the United States; situated on the soil of a nominally hostile nation, it
is technically extraterritorial, and therefore no U.S. court has jurisdiction to review
the legal status of the prisoners there.102 Additionally, the United States has
designated the prisoners “unlawful combatants” in an attempt to deny them
protections they would otherwise enjoy under the laws of war.103 Perhaps worst of
all is the simple fact that, while some of the Guantánamo detainees are dangerous
terrorists, many have been identified as entirely uninvolved with the Taliban, Al
Qaeda, or terror—and yet remain in captivity, with no legal recourse.104
The Guantánamo prisoners have also suffered a significant derogation of their
presumably non-derogable human rights. It is, of course, difficult to determine
which accusations that have been leveled at the United States regarding the
conditions of captivity are accurate; however, even the conditions which the United
States admits to may be adequate to make a case for degrading treatment, forbidden
by the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),105 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),106 and by the applicable Geneva
Conventions.107 Other provisions of UDHR and ICCPR, such as the guarantees of a
fair and impartial hearing and equality before the law, and the bars against arbitrary
arrest and detention, may be violated by the conditions at Guantánamo.108 The
guarantee of personhood before the law may have been eroded by the legal status of
the Guantánamo naval base.109 Even the right to life guaranteed by UDHR and
ICCPR may be imperiled if the United States proceeds with plans to build a death
102

See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). By terms of the
Guantánamo Bay lease, Cuba maintains ultimate sovereignty even though the U.S. possesses
total control; thus, it has been held that prisoners there are outside U.S. territory. Id.
103
See Lewis, supra note 94. The Geneva Conventions guarantee certain rights and
privileges to prisoners of war (among them the right to limited interrogations). See id. By
simply redefining their detainees as “unlawful combatants” and the “war on terror” as not a
war, the U.S. has effectively denied their captives these benefits. Id.
104

One such individual is Mehdi Ghezali, the only Swedish prisoner held at Guantánamo.
Swedish authorities have expressed to their U.S. counterparts the opinion that Ghezali had no
involvement with illegal behavior before his arrest, and indeed the U.S. has agreed. Id.
Despite this apparent agreement, the U.S. nevertheless refuses to release Ghezali because he is
“not cooperating with the authorities.” Munir Ahmad and Tommy Grandell, Eleven
Pakistanis Freed From Guantánamo Bay After Two Years of Imprisonment, THE GUARDIAN
(LONDON), July 18, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/pakistan/Story/
0,2763,1000589,00.html (last visited August 23, 2003).
105
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.
No. 13, art. 5, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
106

ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 7. Note that under the terms of ICCPR Article 4, this is a
non-derogable right. Id. art. 4.
107

See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Of course, for this provision to apply to those
captured in combat, they would have to be designated prisoners of war, which the U.S.
steadfastly refuses to do.
108

UDHR, supra note 105, arts. 7, 9-10; ICCPR, supra note 83, arts. 9, 14.

109

UDHR, supra note 105, art. 6; ICCPR, supra note 83, art. 10.
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row or execution chamber on the base.110 In short, the U.S. treatment of the prisoners
taken during Operation Enduring Freedom and afterwards has denied them their very
existence as individuals deserving of the protections of the international human
rights system, while at the same time denying them any legal recourse to recover the
benefits of those rights.
These circumstances provide fertile ground upon which to interrogate the utility
of a formal global citizenship. To be sure, the hypothetical global passport system
developed above is not intended to protect terrorists or encourage their ease of travel.
However, at least some of the individuals held at Guantánamo are, by all accounts,
innocent of any wrongdoing, yet still face indefinite detention and an undetermined
fate. Several countries have been vocal about their opposition to U.S. delays in
determining the status of their citizens. Yet, the ultimate fate of Afghan and Iraqi
nationals remains unclear and undetermined. Both of these nations have had their
governments forcibly removed by the U.S. and its allies; in each case, the
replacement government has no interest in securing the rights of its citizens. If
perhaps not officially, these citizens are nevertheless de facto stateless.
For the Guantánamo prisoners, a formal global citizenship would help, through
the action of an interested state, to secure the rights guaranteed to them by the
UDHR, the ICCPR, and the Geneva Conventions. Statelessness is, by definition, the
lack of any state to exercise sovereignty over an individual, or in the Guantánamo
situation, the lack of any desire to exercise sovereignty. The United States has
utilized the unique characteristics of Guantánamo to create a kind of faux
sovereignty over the detainees held there, and has used that sovereignty to redefine
their fundamental identity as that of something less than people. With no genuine
international oversight (particularly for Afghanis and Iraqis), this false sovereignty is
essentially the only sovereignty over these individuals.
Formal global citizenship would allow Guantánamo captives to call upon a nation
or nations that shares their cultural values, which could, in turn, attempt to protect
their basic human rights by virtue of the deterritorialized, relational, and identitybased connections between them. For example, Iraqi nationals held in Guantánamo
could call upon the government of Saudi Arabia to attempt to secure their release;
given the warm relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. and the Saudi efforts to
secure the rights and release of their own nationals, such an appeal is far more likely
to succeed than a direct appeal to the U.S. or an indirect appeal to the U.S. through
the occupying government in Iraq.111 A global passport would also increase the
legitimacy of the claims of international human rights organizations, such as the
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, to exercise some measure of oversight regarding the
status of the detainees, their conditions of treatment, and the level of respect shown
for their rights.
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One case is of particular interest from the perspective of the global citizenship
system presented here, as it involves a group of men who are likely to benefit, not
simply from the stateless aspect of a formal global citizenship, but also from the
possibilities it holds in the area of economics and freedom of travel. On November
8, 2002, four men—two brothers, Bisher and Wahab al-Rawi, and their business
associates, Jamal El Banna and Abdullah El Janoudi—were arrested by Gambia's
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) upon their arrival in Banjul, where they had set
up a peanut processing plant.112 Some days earlier, El Banna had been visited by
British intelligence agents who indicated knowledge of his intention to travel to
Gambia, but expressed no objections.113 Nevertheless, El Banna, along with El
Janoudi and Bisher al-Rawi, were arrested on November 2nd when they attempted to
board a plane at Gatwick.114 They were held for two days, apparently because one of
the men had a battery charger in his luggage.115 Though the men were released
without being charged, the British allegedly informed the Gambians of the trip and
advised the NIA to arrest the four men.116 The four were questioned by Gambian and
U.S. officials for approximately a month, during which time they were threatened
with beatings and rape.117 On December 5th, Wahab al-Rawi and Abdullah El
Janoudi, both UK nationals, were released due to the intervention of the British high
commissioner.118
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil El Banna, however, remained in custody for
approximately two months in Gambia thereafter, at which time they were transferred
to U.S. custody and moved to Baghram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.119 After an
indeterminate amount of time there, they were moved to Guantánamo Bay, where
they remain.120 Britons in particular have taken issue with their government's
treatment of the case; Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi national legally resident in the
United Kingdom, while Jamil El Banna is a Jordanian with refugee status in the
UK.121 However, “the British government is washing their hands” of the two men,
according to one MP, despite the fact that both of them lack any other government to
represent their interests.122 The MP, Edward Davey, suggested that the information
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the Gambian and U.S. officials had on Bisher al-Rawi “must have come from the UK
authorities”, and that their suspicions may have been aroused by al-Rawi's hobbies,
including “flying planes and parachuting.”123
Al-Rawi and El Banna could clearly enjoy the same benefits as other stateless
individuals; as an Iraqi national, al-Rawi cannot count on the occupation government
of England and the U.S. to do anything on his behalf, and similarly El Banna cannot
hope for Jordan to intercede on his behalf when he fled that country because of
persecution.124 But additional benefits may have accrued to these two gentlemen had
they held global passports as described above. For example, freedom of movement
on their entry into Gambia would have doubtless been of great advantage. Had the
Gambians had legitimate reason to suspect they had terrorist ties, they could have
refused them entry and returned them to the United Kingdom. Further, any country
which, in good faith, suspected the quartet of terrorist activity could have protested
to the hypothetical global passport organization in an effort to prevent their
acquisition of such a passport and the benefits that would arise from it.
In short, these men, like many of those they are held with, seem to be innocent of
any wrongdoing. Yet, their situation is even more grim than many of those captured
on the battlefields of Afghanistan; they were not taken captive as a direct result of
the war on terror, and thus cannot hope to benefit from being classified as a prisoner
of war. It would certainly seem that these men were singled out because of their
interests, because of their religion, because of their race, or some combination of the
three. By permitting them to appeal to a nation which shares their religious values or
other cultural norms, rather than to nations which are either disinterested or openly
hostile to their cause, some basic modicum of justice can be achieved, and they can
enjoy the benefits of internationally recognized legal procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
In closing, it might be simplest to recount what the proposed formal global
citizenship described here is not. It is not an easy solution to the various problems
raised by citizenship scholars over the past six decades. Indeed, it does not comport
perfectly with any citizenship theory. On the other hand, it is clear that in a
postnational world, a global citizenship can become a reality, even without a world
government. By being codified in treaty form, and by involving states in the
administration of global citizenship, the model presented here peacefully co-exists
with the sovereignty of nation-states. Especially because of the limited infringement
on sovereignty, formal global citizenship presents no insoluble theoretical problem.
Additionally, though this essay touches only upon statelessness as the most
immediate and tangible benefit to be gained from the formal global citizenship
model, there are a number of other possibilities. For example, there are symbolic
benefits to be gained in creating a formal global citizenship. The existence of a
global passport and the ability to truly become a “citizen of the world” would make
clear to skeptics that globalization is a reality.125 Linked to globalization and the
symbolic benefits of a formal global citizenship, is the growth of social change under
123
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the rubric of democracy.126 This move toward social change on the international
plane is evident in the increased demand for uniform international human rights,
environmental, and labor norms.127 By interrogating the fundamental validity of
solely nation-based conceptions of citizenship while simultaneously preserving
national sovereignty and cultural differences, global citizenship can encourage global
discourse about such topics.128
We have also alluded to potential functional benefits in the areas of free
movement of persons and economics. Freedom of movement–especially in this postSeptember 11th world, where concerns about immigration security are heightened
worldwide–necessarily raises serious concerns about permitting terrorists or other
security risks into a nation’s borders. However, the seriousness of this problem
depends largely on the definition of “freedom of movement” one chooses to employ.
One definition that might be viable for a global passport holder leaves nation-states
in control of entry. This definition incorporates as the components of free movement
the rights to leave a country, to enter one’s own country, and to move freely within a
country once admitted, but not to enter the country of one’s choosing.129 To be sure,
such a definition would have been of great value to Bisher al-Rawi and Jamal El
Banna on their arrival in Gambia.
Another area fraught with potential benefits and dangers is economics.130 Indeed,
international businessmen like al-Rawi and El Banna–representatives of global
economics–could, in happier times, stand to gain the most from holding a global
passport insofar as it facilitates their travel. In many respects this would formalize
traditional practice, as ties between the economic elite already exist informally by
virtue of multinational corporations, international specialty groups, and the high
mobility of the well educated.131 Increasing freedom of travel for economic reasons,
however, raises concerns regarding the increased transnationality of unskilled and
semiskilled labor.132 Another problem is one developing in the European Union: the
freedom of the unemployed or impoverished to take advantage of the agreeable
126
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welfare provisions of other states.133 Resolving these issues in the context of a global
citizenship will not be easy and we do not purport to solve these problems here.
The full breadth of the benefits that may accrue from a formal global citizenship
remains to be seen, but real people can enjoy immediate betterment through such an
apparatus. By relying on deterritorialized, relational and identity-based conceptions
of citizenship, a formal global citizenship can render the stateless functional citizens
and permit them to seek the vindication of their human rights through nations who
share their cultural or social values. We have seen how such a conceptualization of
global citizenship can be of real, practical benefit to individuals such as the detainees
held in Guantánamo Bay who might otherwise have no one to defend their rights on
the international plane. The model of formal global citizenship proposed here is
intended to be an incremental, rather than radical, step in globalization. The aim is
to provide real, practical benefits to individuals while paving the way to further
international cooperation, and, at the same time, to provide the fulfillment of an
ancient ideal by permitting an individual to truly become a “citizen of the world.”134
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